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Post by Deleted on Apr 19, 2020 18:19:04 GMT
Is this an eyewitness account?
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Post by TonyDunkley on Apr 20, 2020 8:40:18 GMT
I can't imagine how posting the above piece of unattributed garbage reporting, or the accompanying doggerel, could be expected to add anything useful to what is being discussed here. It does, however, serve to illustrate the sad truth that some 30 years worth of focusing attention almost exclusively on futile blame apportioning for the BOWBELLE/MARCHIONESS collision has achieved nothing apart from diverting attention away from establishing the true fundamental causes of the accident, and even more importantly, from identifying and applying the practical measures needed to both prevent a repeat of a similar type of accident, and to improve the navigational safety of Thames tideway traffic in general. In mentioning measures to improve the general navigational safety of Thames tideway traffic, I'm thinking back in particular to an incident in August 2018, almost exactly 29 years after the MARCHIONESS sinking, when C&RT staff, with no warnings about what might lay ahead of them, were routinely despatching ill-prepared pleasure boaters, including some with no previous Thames tideway experience, upriver from Limehouse and into a situation in which, by following the standard navigational guidance and rules published by both C&RT and the PLA, they would be forced into sharing the deepwater channel and the main navigation arches of the bridges upriver from and including Blackfriars Bridge with large commercial vessels in the, to the pleasure boaters, very unfamiliar circumstances of being relentlessly pushed along by the incoming tide. One has to wonder, and ask, what has been learned and how has navigational safety on the Thames tideway improved since 20 August 1989 ? *1) I found it necessary to highlight the errors made by a captain from whose arse the sun did not in fact shine, despite efforts made to have it appear so. *2) I managed to decode what must be the longest sentence ever constructed on this forum (and with more caveats than a BT contract) to find that the incident referred to does not in fact feature within it. *3) Have you ever tried writing to the PLA? It might have more effect than bitching on a obscure internet forum. 1) There is nothing positive to be gained via attempts to apportion blame, . . especially when those attempts come from people who clearly don't have a clue about how the handling of ships or other large commercial vessels is affected in the, relatively, shallow confines of a 'deepwater' river channel. 2) The significance of the incident referred to lies not in it's detail, but in the fact that pleasure craft were being sent on their way inbound from Limehouse without being warned that they were heading into a situation in which they would probably be forced into sharing the deepwater channel and the main navigation arches of at least one of the bridges upriver with large commercial vessels operating to or from the Thames sewage tunnel works going on at the time. Sharing the deepwater channel and the main navigation arch of a bridge with a large commercial was the primary cause of the MARCHIONESS sinking ! 3) No, I didn't write to the PLA, I took the quicker and more effective option of speaking directly to the PLA Harbourmaster's office instead. They were very grateful for being notified of the incident, which resulted in the pleasure boat being swept into one of the Blackfriars Bridge piers side-on by the tide, and they were even more concerned by the negligence evident on the part of the C&RT lock staff at Limehouse in sending holidaying pleasure boaters on their way without any sort of warnings, or instructions, to either the pleasure craft or the commercials on the potentially highly dangerous situation likely to develop between vessels in the vicinity of the sewage tunnel works.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 20, 2020 8:52:56 GMT
Yes the sewer tunnel work sites have definitely introduced some hazards for inward bound craft. It's already quite a dangerous place on account of the number of bridges and the non-aligned nature of their various support structures. Add to that any wind over tide effect and it's also quite bouncy. It's interesting that the staff at Limehouse have minimal intervention although I did hear of them stopping someone who's boat was going to sink because of the air cooling slots in the side and his insistence he was going to France. So they are responsible to an extent. Whether they have the legal authority to refuse passage I'm not sure. And they do ask about anchors, lifejackets and VHF (mandatory for boats over 13.7m/45ft). At the end of the day it is up to the boat owner to do their due diligence and familiarise themselves with the procedures. There was some chatter about banning modern non professional narrow boats but I don't think that would really be very feasible, and could possibly be illegal bearing in mind the right to navigate on tidal water. Having said that perhaps tidal water only now extends as far as the Thames Barrier. ETA the PLA do know about the issues and have changed the reporting points for vessels transiting through the area. This is visible on Notice to Mariners no.9 of 2019. It would have been worth excluding small narrow boats from the VHF exemption because people on small narrow boats are likely to be less familiar with commercial waterways than those who the exemption was aimed at ie small cruisers and yachts coming in from open water. Notice to Mariners. VHF is useful. I think a really useful device would be a VHF receiver with an earphone. So you could have the info in your ears at all time. I just heard tug Redoubt report "London Bridge in" on the radio a minute ago. Actually I am going to try and make up a little pocketable VHF receiver with a single earpiece for myself. Nice little project actually.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 20, 2020 11:22:52 GMT
*1) I found it necessary to highlight the errors made by a captain from whose arse the sun did not in fact shine, despite efforts made to have it appear so. *2) I managed to decode what must be the longest sentence ever constructed on this forum (and with more caveats than a BT contract) to find that the incident referred to does not in fact feature within it. *3) Have you ever tried writing to the PLA? It might have more effect than bitching on a obscure internet forum. 1) There is nothing positive to be gained via attempts to apportion blame, . . especially when those attempts come from people who clearly don't have a clue about how the handling of ships or other large commercial vessels is affected in the, relatively, shallow confines of a 'deepwater' river channel. 2) The significance of the incident referred to lies not in it's detail, but in the fact that pleasure craft were being sent on their way inbound from Limehouse without being warned that they were heading into a situation in which they would probably be forced into sharing the deepwater channel and the main navigation arches of at least one of the bridges upriver with large commercial vessels operating to or from the Thames sewage tunnel works going on at the time. Sharing the deepwater channel and the main navigation arch of a bridge with a large commercial was the primary cause of the MARCHIONESS sinking ! 3) No, I didn't write to the PLA, I took the quicker and more effective option of speaking directly to the PLA Harbourmaster's office instead. They were very grateful for being notified of the incident, which resulted in the pleasure boat being swept into one of the Blackfriars Bridge piers side-on by the tide, and they were even more concerned by the negligence evident on the part of the C&RT lock staff at Limehouse in sending holidaying pleasure boaters on their way without any sort of warnings, or instructions, to either the pleasure craft or the commercials on the potentially highly dangerous situation likely to develop between vessels in the vicinity of the sewage tunnel works. 1. It certainly wouldn't have brought back the dead but it would have prevented somebody directly responsible for their deaths and who was found to have lied to the court to save his own miserable skin from having the opportunity to do it again. Are you saying it would have been quite impossible for the Bowbelle to have reduced speed and / or stopped? Because I simply don't accept that. 2. The primary cause of the sinking of the Marchioness was that no-one on either vessel was keeping a lookout. This makes the fact that Bowbelle rammed the Marchioness and ran her over killing 51 people a secondary issue, surprisingly. 3. Are you referring to a different incident now? If you are saying that pleasure craft ought to have completed some kind of educational course before being allowed onto the tidal Thames I would agree, as I would support the idea of all such craft taking a pilot of some description along instead (there are a few seemingly knowledgeable persons who regularly volunteer for this sort of thing). BTW, the Marchioness disaster was the first major loss of life since the sinking of the Princess Alice, 101 years earlier, was it not? Its an interesting point actually - How many accidents involving loss of life or sinking have there been since then? I suppose the RNLI could tell you.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 20, 2020 11:27:49 GMT
Actually I am going to try and make up a little pocketable VHF receiver with a single earpiece for myself. Nice little project actually. I have a PFD that has a pocket specifically for a VHF radio near the top of the device. This has the added benefit that the radio is always with you when sailing. Also, dispatch riders often use a sort of holster that holds the radio in a similar place. It may be easier to make on of those than a whole new radio.
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Post by TonyDunkley on Apr 20, 2020 17:42:00 GMT
1) There is nothing positive to be gained via attempts to apportion blame, . . especially when those attempts come from people who clearly don't have a clue about how the handling of ships or other large commercial vessels is affected in the, relatively, shallow confines of a 'deepwater' river channel. 2) The significance of the incident referred to lies not in it's detail, but in the fact that pleasure craft were being sent on their way inbound from Limehouse without being warned that they were heading into a situation in which they would probably be forced into sharing the deepwater channel and the main navigation arches of at least one of the bridges upriver with large commercial vessels operating to or from the Thames sewage tunnel works going on at the time. Sharing the deepwater channel and the main navigation arch of a bridge with a large commercial was the primary cause of the MARCHIONESS sinking ! 3) No, I didn't write to the PLA, I took the quicker and more effective option of speaking directly to the PLA Harbourmaster's office instead. They were very grateful for being notified of the incident, which resulted in the pleasure boat being swept into one of the Blackfriars Bridge piers side-on by the tide, and they were even more concerned by the negligence evident on the part of the C&RT lock staff at Limehouse in sending holidaying pleasure boaters on their way without any sort of warnings, or instructions, to either the pleasure craft or the commercials on the potentially highly dangerous situation likely to develop between vessels in the vicinity of the sewage tunnel works. 1. It certainly wouldn't have brought back the dead but it would have prevented somebody directly responsible for their deaths and who was found to have lied to the court to save his own miserable skin from having the opportunity to do it again. Are you saying it would have been quite impossible for the Bowbelle to have reduced speed and / or stopped? Because I simply don't accept that. 2. The primary cause of the sinking of the Marchioness was that no-one on either vessel was keeping a lookout. This makes the fact that Bowbelle rammed the Marchioness and ran her over killing 51 people a secondary issue, surprisingly. 3. Are you referring to a different incident now? If you are saying that pleasure craft ought to have completed some kind of educational course before being allowed onto the tidal Thames I would agree, as I would support the idea of all such craft taking a pilot of some description along instead (there are a few seemingly knowledgeable persons who regularly volunteer for this sort of thing). BTW, the Marchioness disaster was the first major loss of life since the sinking of the Princess Alice, 101 years earlier, was it not? Its an interesting point actually - How many accidents involving loss of life or sinking have there been since then? I suppose the RNLI could tell you. 1) No, . . what I have been saying from the outset is that picking out and identifying MARCHIONESS's lights from all the surrounding extraneous lights, and reflections in the water, along either bank of the river and on the approaching bridges, from either the wheelhouse or foredeck of BOWBELLE would have been very difficult, if not well nigh impossible, until both vessels were very close to each other, . . almost certainly too close for either vessel to take effective avoiding action. See below; ref. the "answer provided on page 5) of this thread". 2) The primary cause of the sinking of MARCHIONESS was the fact that the vessel was crawling along, in the dark, in the deepwater channel through the same bridge arches that any outbound commercial would be taking at that time, and at that state of the tide. In other words, the pleasure cruiser/launch was occupying a part of the river where it had no business to be, . . . at that time, and at that state of the tide. I refer you, yet again, to the answer I provided on page 5) of this thread :- "The lack of astern visibility from the wheelhouse of 'Marchioness' was all the more reason for not to be dawdling along, in the dark, smack in the middle of the deepwater channel on the line that would have to be taken by any outbound ship or commercial between Southwark and Cannon Street Railway Bridges. On the night of the sinking, a sister ship to 'Marchioness', and another ex-Salter's steamer, the 'Hurlingham', with equally bad rearward visibility, was also out on a virtually identical schedule and was overtaken, safely and without incident, by the 'Bowbelle' just moments before hitting the 'Marchioness'. What made for the two vastly different outcomes of two closely consecutive overtakes by the 'Bowbelle' ? The 'Marchioness' was travelling at around half the speed of the 'Bowbelle' in a part of the river where it should NOT have been, . . and the 'Hurlingham', making about the same speed as the 'Marchioness', WAS where it should have been and didn't use the central spans of either Southwark or Cannon Street Bridges." 3) No, I'm not referring to a different incident, . . and nor am I saying that the skippers of pleasure craft should be obliged to have any sort of qualification for the Thames tideway. What I am saying is that pleasure craft inbound from Limehouse should be made aware of and instructed on how to deal with any known potentially dangerous situations they could be running into on their way upriver, . . such as the possibility of inbound pleasure craft being pushed along by the incoming tide encountering outbound large commercials using the same bridge arches as the pleasure craft in the vicinity of the Thames sewage tunnel works. It is equally important, of course, that the lock staff at Limehouse inform the large commercials, via the VTS, of the inbound pleasure craft, . . the pleasure craft being the 'stand-on' vessels whilst the Flood is running up, under PLA Byelaw 25. Immediately prior to the 2018 incident referred to, the pleasure boat which collided with the piers of Blackfriars Bridge whilst trying, wrongly, to giveway to an outbound large commercial received no such advice or instructions from the lock staff at Limehouse, and nor was the VTS advised of it's presence on the tideway, it's destination, or it's ETA in the vicinity of the Thames sewage tunnel works.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 20, 2020 17:54:10 GMT
It would definitely be good if LH marina office informed VTS on channel 14 of boats leaving the lock and heading inward bound. Less important for outward bound traffic due to type of boat and lack of bridges. I still disagree slightly with your answer to this though "What made for the two vastly different outcomes of two closely consecutive overtakes by the 'Bowbelle' " I personally think that what made the difference was the fact that the skipper on Marchioness had no rear view at all. The Hurlingham does allow some rear view from the helm. Obviously without any AIS track data as it was before AIS it is more or less impossible to know whether the Hurlingham had been in the way of the Bowbelle but simply moved out of the way because skipper -knew- it was bearing down on his vessel and this gave a green light to the skipper of Marchioness to increase speed and overtake Hurlingham. You never know they might even have been in some sort of race. It's not unknown, maybe even something about trying to impress someone. Loads of possible situations available here. Perhaps there is another side to this which is that a pleasure trip down the Thames tideway at night is more pleasant if you are not hugging the bank, there is more to see and the customers are happier
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Post by Deleted on Apr 20, 2020 19:43:36 GMT
1. It certainly wouldn't have brought back the dead but it would have prevented somebody directly responsible for their deaths and who was found to have lied to the court to save his own miserable skin from having the opportunity to do it again. Are you saying it would have been quite impossible for the Bowbelle to have reduced speed and / or stopped? Because I simply don't accept that. 2. The primary cause of the sinking of the Marchioness was that no-one on either vessel was keeping a lookout. This makes the fact that Bowbelle rammed the Marchioness and ran her over killing 51 people a secondary issue, surprisingly. 3. Are you referring to a different incident now? If you are saying that pleasure craft ought to have completed some kind of educational course before being allowed onto the tidal Thames I would agree, as I would support the idea of all such craft taking a pilot of some description along instead (there are a few seemingly knowledgeable persons who regularly volunteer for this sort of thing). BTW, the Marchioness disaster was the first major loss of life since the sinking of the Princess Alice, 101 years earlier, was it not? Its an interesting point actually - How many accidents involving loss of life or sinking have there been since then? I suppose the RNLI could tell you. 1) No, . . what I have been saying from the outset is that picking out and identifying MARCHIONESS's lights from all the surrounding extraneous lights, and reflections in the water, along either bank of the river and on the approaching bridges, from either the wheelhouse or foredeck of BOWBELLE would have been very difficult, if not well nigh impossible, until both vessels were very close to each other, . . almost certainly too close for either vessel to take effective avoiding action. See below; ref. the "answer provided on page 5) of this thread". 2) The primary cause of the sinking of MARCHIONESS was the fact that the vessel was crawling along, in the dark, in the deepwater channel through the same bridge arches that any outbound commercial would be taking at that time, and at that state of the tide. In other words, the pleasure cruiser/launch was occupying a part of the river where it had no business to be, . . . at that time, and at that state of the tide. I refer you, yet again, to the answer I provided on page 5) of this thread :- "The lack of astern visibility from the wheelhouse of 'Marchioness' was all the more reason for not to be dawdling along, in the dark, smack in the middle of the deepwater channel on the line that would have to be taken by any outbound ship or commercial between Southwark and Cannon Street Railway Bridges. On the night of the sinking, a sister ship to 'Marchioness', and another ex-Salter's steamer, the 'Hurlingham', with equally bad rearward visibility, was also out on a virtually identical schedule and was overtaken, safely and without incident, by the 'Bowbelle' just moments before hitting the 'Marchioness'. What made for the two vastly different outcomes of two closely consecutive overtakes by the 'Bowbelle' ? The 'Marchioness' was travelling at around half the speed of the 'Bowbelle' in a part of the river where it should NOT have been, . . and the 'Hurlingham', making about the same speed as the 'Marchioness', WAS where it should have been and didn't use the central spans of either Southwark or Cannon Street Bridges." And I'll say that's bollocks. Wether or not Marchioness was visible makes no difference. The Bowbelle failed to maintain an adequate lookout and even if this poor lookout had in fact seen Marchioness and perceived the danger, he (the lookout, and there was only one, not two as claimed at the trial) had no way of communicating with the bridge, who could see nothing ahead for at least 400 yards, lit or otherwise.
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Post by TonyDunkley on Apr 20, 2020 23:28:24 GMT
1) No, . . what I have been saying from the outset is that picking out and identifying MARCHIONESS's lights from all the surrounding extraneous lights, and reflections in the water, along either bank of the river and on the approaching bridges, from either the wheelhouse or foredeck of BOWBELLE would have been very difficult, if not well nigh impossible, until both vessels were very close to each other, . . almost certainly too close for either vessel to take effective avoiding action. See below; ref. the "answer provided on page 5) of this thread". 2) The primary cause of the sinking of MARCHIONESS was the fact that the vessel was crawling along, in the dark, in the deepwater channel through the same bridge arches that any outbound commercial would be taking at that time, and at that state of the tide. In other words, the pleasure cruiser/launch was occupying a part of the river where it had no business to be, . . . at that time, and at that state of the tide. I refer you, yet again, to the answer I provided on page 5) of this thread :- "The lack of astern visibility from the wheelhouse of 'Marchioness' was all the more reason for not to be dawdling along, in the dark, smack in the middle of the deepwater channel on the line that would have to be taken by any outbound ship or commercial between Southwark and Cannon Street Railway Bridges. On the night of the sinking, a sister ship to 'Marchioness', and another ex-Salter's steamer, the 'Hurlingham', with equally bad rearward visibility, was also out on a virtually identical schedule and was overtaken, safely and without incident, by the 'Bowbelle' just moments before hitting the 'Marchioness'. What made for the two vastly different outcomes of two closely consecutive overtakes by the 'Bowbelle' ? The 'Marchioness' was travelling at around half the speed of the 'Bowbelle' in a part of the river where it should NOT have been, . . and the 'Hurlingham', making about the same speed as the 'Marchioness', WAS where it should have been and didn't use the central spans of either Southwark or Cannon Street Bridges." And I'll say that's bollocks. Wether or not Marchioness was visible makes no difference. The Bowbelle failed to maintain an adequate lookout and even if this poor lookout had in fact seen Marchioness and perceived the danger, he (the lookout, and there was only one, not two as claimed at the trial) had no way of communicating with the bridge, who could see nothing ahead for at least 400 yards, lit or otherwise. If, to quote from your post - "W(h)ether or not Marchioness was visible makes no difference" - why are you wittering endlessly on about the effectiveness of BOWBELLE's foredeck lookout ? However much you might wish it to be otherwise, the simple inescapable truth is that MARCHIONESS was clouted and sunk because, in contravention of the Colregs, PLA Byelaws, customary good practice, and above all, sheer common sense and basic survival instincts, it was outbound at a mere 3 knots in the deepwater channel under the centre arch [No.3] of Southwark Bridge where it had no business to be, in the dark, at that time, and at that state of the tide.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 21, 2020 12:45:48 GMT
The simple inescapable truth is that Marchioness was just as guilty of failing to maintain a lookout as Bowbelle (but it was Bowbelle that rammed and sank Marchioness, not the other way round). However resolutely you cling to your beliefs, the failure on the part of Marchioness to maintain a lookout did not absolve Bowbelle of any responsibility as clearly stated under Colregs. Here they are: Part A - General Rule 2 - Responsibility (a) Nothing in these Rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner, master, or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to comply with these Rules or of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances of the case.(b) In construing and complying with these Rules due regard shall be had to all dangers of navigation and collision and to any special circumstances, including the limitations of the vessels involved, which may make a departure from these Rules necessary to avoid immediate danger. Part B - Steering and Sailing Rules Section I - Conduct of Vessels in any Condition of Visibility Rule 5 - Look-out Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight as well as by hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision. Rule 7 - Risk of Collision (a) Every vessel shall use all available means appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision exists. If there is any doubt such risk shall be deemed to exist.(b) Proper use shall be made of radar equipment if fitted and operational, including long-range scanning to obtain early warning of risk of collision and radar plotting or equivalent systematic observation of detected objects. (c) Assumptions shall not be made on the basis of scanty information, especially scanty radar information. (d) In determining if risk of collision exists the following considerations shall be among those taken into account: (i) Such risk shall be deemed to exist if the compass bearing of an approaching vessel does not appreciably change; (ii) Such risk may sometimes exist even when an appreciable bearing change is evident, particularly when approaching a very large vessel or a tow or when approaching a vessel at close range. Rule 8 - Action to Avoid Collision (a) Any action to avoid collision shall be taken in accordance with the Rules of this Part and shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, be positive, made in ample time and with due regard to the observance of good seamanship. (b) Any alteration of course and/or speed to avoid collision shall, if the circumstances of the case admit be large enough to be readily apparent to another vessel observing visually or by radar; a succession of small alterations of course and/or speed shall be avoided. (c) If there is sufficient sea room, alteration of course alone may be the most effective action to avoid a close-quarters situation provided that it is made in good time, is substantial and does not result in another close-quarters situation. (d) Action taken to avoid collision with another vessel shall be such as to result in passing at a safe distance. The effectiveness of the action shall be carefully checked until the other vessel is finally past and clear. (e) If necessary to avoid collision or allow more time to asses the situation, a vessel may slacken her speed or take all way off by stopping or reversing her means of propulsion.
(f) (i) A vessel which, by any of these rules, is required not to impede the passage or safe passage of another vessel shall when required by the circumstances of the case, take early action to allow sufficient sea room for the safe passage of the other vessel. (ii) A vessel required not to impede the passage or safe passage of another vessel is not relieved of this obligation if approaching the other vessel so as to involve risk of collision and shall, when taking action, have full regard to the action which may be required by the rules of this part. (iii) A vessel the passage of which is not to be impeded remains fully obliged to comply with the rules of this part when the two vessels are approaching one another so as to involve risk of collision.I'm glad your boat is decommissioned - at least there is little chance of anyone encountering you toodling down the river. www.bosunsmate.org/seamanship/rulesoftheroad.php
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