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Post by Deleted on Apr 8, 2020 20:50:21 GMT
Apr 8, 2020 19:01:04 GMT 1 TonyDunkley said: Point 1) What difference do you think the two forard lookouts on 'Bowbelle' could have made to the overall outcome AT, or after, the ''moment of impact'' between 'Bowbelle' and 'Marchioness'. Your reply to 1) None at all, since neither had any means of contacting or signalling the bridge; the Bowbelle's captain later admitted he distrusted and disliked VHF and as a result rarely used them. There is (unsurprisingly) no evidence that the lookouts were performing their duty at the point of collision. I repeat the question: What difference do you think the two forard lookouts on 'Bowbelle' could have made to the overall outcome AT, or after, the ''moment of impact'' between 'Bowbelle' and 'Marchioness' ? ____________________________________________________________ Point 2) As for the mention of 'trim' and wheelhouse 'visibility' on 'Bowbelle', . . neither has any real bearing on the cause of the collision, and in any case there was nothing unusual about either, and both were comparable with and similar to any low-profile coaster built to trade to inland destinations on the UK's larger rivers, when underway in ballast. Your reply to 2) Well, yes it does, because on the day in question the Bowbelle had been laded in such a way that the bow was at a higher angle than was normal, and the difference resulted in a blind-spot of somewhere slightly in excess of 400 yards from the bridge, roughly twice as much as was common.
'Bowbelle' wasn't 'laden' at all ! It was, as stated, 'in ballast', and it's trim was entirely consistent with that condition. ____________________________________________________________ Point 3) Your comment concerning - "the 'Bowbelle' and it's crew [carrying] on past the point of impact without any attempt to lend assistance" - is, quite frankly, risible ! Do you really think having an (approx) 1800 ton DW ship try to hold position in a 3 knot tide in a part of the river that's filling up with swimming survivors from the capsized 'Marchioness' would be the right course of action in the circumstances ?? Your reply to 3) The Bowbelle did not even so much as chuck a life-ring or two over the side, and only made contact with the river authority of the time when it had reached Gallions Reach. The transcript of the message sent strongly indicates that the captain was already trying to absolve himself of blame by suggesting he had no idea of what had happened apart from saying he 'thought he had hit something', a view difficult to accept given the not-inconsiderable size of the Marchioness.
I'll take that as a 'no' - and that you don't think that having an (approx) 1800 ton DW ship try to hold position in a 3 knot tide in a part of the river that's filling up with swimming survivors from the capsized 'Marchioness' would be the right course of action in the circumstances. ____________________________________________________________ Point 4) With regard to your final comment to the effect that - "the notion that the Marchioness deliberately altered course to port is pure speculation", I have to ask, in light of the relevant facts on vessel hull interaction and other information available - such as the position of the engine controls as noted above, what is there in any report or anything else to suggest that 'Marchioness' was NOT attempting to cut across the bows of the 'Bowbelle' and to pass under arch No.2 of Cannon Street Railway Bridge ? Your reply to 4) Nothing in the evidence supports either party. This is why, despite the verdict that those who had died were 'unlawfully killed', no charges were brought against any company or individual involved in the disaster. In fact the whole incident is in large part a matter of speculation. It is unsurprising to me that you come down on the side of the Bowbelle and its crew which, incidentally, had a poor operating record, as did its captain. This a matter of record - look it up. I repeat, . . in light of the relevant facts on vessel hull interaction and other information available - such as the position of the engine controls as noted above, what is there in any report or anything else to suggest that 'Marchioness' was NOT attempting to cut across the bows of the 'Bowbelle' and to pass under arch No.2 of Cannon Street Railway Bridge ? If, as I suspect, you don't have a clue about how vessels such as the 'Marchioness' behave when being overtaken at close-quarters by much larger vessels, such as 'Bowbelle', or the significance of the engine controls on 'Marchioness' being found at 'full ahead' when the vessel was raised, I suggest you acquaint yourself with the basics instead of posting any more ill-informed opinions. I suggest you see a psychiatrist before your head explodes. Its funny, I've been talking with Lollygagger about pill-pushing doctors but boy could you do with one.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 8, 2020 20:58:08 GMT
'Bowbelle' wasn't 'laden' at all ! It was, as stated, 'in ballast', and it's trim was entirely consistent with that condition. This statement alone makes it clear you have very selectively read around the issues and that you make up your own assumptions to suit your own crazy version of reality. Now where have we seen this pattern before? Hmm...
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Post by TonyDunkley on Apr 9, 2020 6:24:59 GMT
'Bowbelle' wasn't 'laden' at all ! It was, as stated, 'in ballast', and it's trim was entirely consistent with that condition. This statement alone makes it clear you have very selectively read around the issues and that you make up your own assumptions to suit your own crazy version of reality. Now where have we seen this pattern before? Hmm... Alright then, pillock, . . . let's hear more about these 'assumptions' you imagine that I've made, . . let everyone share your insight, and understanding of a subject it's plain you know absolutely nothing about !
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Post by Deleted on Apr 9, 2020 6:40:18 GMT
From MIAB report part 1:
3.1 BOWBELLE left the Metro Greenham Aggregates berth at Nine Elms Reach at 01 I2 hrs on 20 August, bound for the Shipwash dredging grounds. She was in ballast, drawing approximately 2.0 metres forward and 3.2 metres aft and. therefore, trimmed some 1.2 metres by the stern
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3.4 BOWBELLE reported to Thames Navigation Service (TNS) (Woolwich Radio) at 0103 Hrs that she was singling up ready to depart. She reported again at Vauxhall Bridge (0 I20 Hrs) and Waterloo Bridge (0135 hrs). For the benefit of other river users Woolwich included her as being outward bound ‘through bridges’ in the routine half-hourly Information broadcasts at 01 15 hrs and 0145 hrs; this was normal practice. No broadcasts were made by or concerning MARCHIONESS, which was also normal.
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So we have a large (80 metre) vessel with limited forward visibility indicating intention and then confirmed as travelling outward bound through bridges via VHF.
And nobody on the smaller vessel heard any of the announcements.
Problem here.
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Post by JohnV on Apr 9, 2020 6:43:20 GMT
Apr 8, 2020 19:01:04 GMT 1 TonyDunkley said: Point 1) What difference do you think the two forard lookouts on 'Bowbelle' could have made to the overall outcome AT, or after, the ''moment of impact'' between 'Bowbelle' and 'Marchioness'. Your reply to 1) None at all, since neither had any means of contacting or signalling the bridge; the Bowbelle's captain later admitted he distrusted and disliked VHF and as a result rarely used them. There is (unsurprisingly) no evidence that the lookouts were performing their duty at the point of collision. I repeat the question: What difference do you think the two forard lookouts on 'Bowbelle' could have made to the overall outcome AT, or after, the ''moment of impact'' between 'Bowbelle' and 'Marchioness' ? ____________________________________________________________ Point 2) As for the mention of 'trim' and wheelhouse 'visibility' on 'Bowbelle', . . neither has any real bearing on the cause of the collision, and in any case there was nothing unusual about either, and both were comparable with and similar to any low-profile coaster built to trade to inland destinations on the UK's larger rivers, when underway in ballast. Your reply to 2) Well, yes it does, because on the day in question the Bowbelle had been laded in such a way that the bow was at a higher angle than was normal, and the difference resulted in a blind-spot of somewhere slightly in excess of 400 yards from the bridge, roughly twice as much as was common.
'Bowbelle' wasn't 'laden' at all ! It was, as stated, 'in ballast', and it's trim was entirely consistent with that condition. ____________________________________________________________ Point 3) Your comment concerning - "the 'Bowbelle' and it's crew [carrying] on past the point of impact without any attempt to lend assistance" - is, quite frankly, risible ! Do you really think having an (approx) 1800 ton DW ship try to hold position in a 3 knot tide in a part of the river that's filling up with swimming survivors from the capsized 'Marchioness' would be the right course of action in the circumstances ?? Your reply to 3) The Bowbelle did not even so much as chuck a life-ring or two over the side, and only made contact with the river authority of the time when it had reached Gallions Reach. The transcript of the message sent strongly indicates that the captain was already trying to absolve himself of blame by suggesting he had no idea of what had happened apart from saying he 'thought he had hit something', a view difficult to accept given the not-inconsiderable size of the Marchioness.
I'll take that as a 'no' - and that you don't think that having an (approx) 1800 ton DW ship try to hold position in a 3 knot tide in a part of the river that's filling up with swimming survivors from the capsized 'Marchioness' would be the right course of action in the circumstances. ____________________________________________________________ Point 4) With regard to your final comment to the effect that - "the notion that the Marchioness deliberately altered course to port is pure speculation", I have to ask, in light of the relevant facts on vessel hull interaction and other information available - such as the position of the engine controls as noted above, what is there in any report or anything else to suggest that 'Marchioness' was NOT attempting to cut across the bows of the 'Bowbelle' and to pass under arch No.2 of Cannon Street Railway Bridge ? Your reply to 4) Nothing in the evidence supports either party. This is why, despite the verdict that those who had died were 'unlawfully killed', no charges were brought against any company or individual involved in the disaster. In fact the whole incident is in large part a matter of speculation. It is unsurprising to me that you come down on the side of the Bowbelle and its crew which, incidentally, had a poor operating record, as did its captain. This a matter of record - look it up. I repeat, . . in light of the relevant facts on vessel hull interaction and other information available - such as the position of the engine controls as noted above, what is there in any report or anything else to suggest that 'Marchioness' was NOT attempting to cut across the bows of the 'Bowbelle' and to pass under arch No.2 of Cannon Street Railway Bridge ? If, as I suspect, you don't have a clue about how vessels such as the 'Marchioness' behave when being overtaken at close-quarters by much larger vessels, such as 'Bowbelle', or the significance of the engine controls on 'Marchioness' being found at 'full ahead' when the vessel was raised, I suggest you acquaint yourself with the basics instead of posting any more ill-informed opinions. I suggest you see a psychiatrist before your head explodes. Its funny, I've been talking with Lollygagger about pill-pushing doctors but boy could you do with one. Your comment about "laded" does not make a great deal of sense. Ballasting on inland water and estuary craft normally consists of increasing the stern draft to get the rudder and propeller under water. In my (somewhat limited I must admit) experience the ballast tank is filled. The requirement of maneuverability taking precedence over any reduction in fwd visibility. (especially when transiting numerous bridges in strong stream conditions)
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Post by Deleted on Apr 9, 2020 8:40:35 GMT
Rivers are simple aren't they ... easy peasy ... oh and we've not got into sandbanks charts and tide times yet. I know my limitations Rog
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Post by JohnV on Apr 9, 2020 8:51:51 GMT
I suggest you see a psychiatrist before your head explodes. Its funny, I've been talking with Lollygagger about pill-pushing doctors but boy could you do with one. Your comment about "laded" does not make a great deal of sense. Ballasting on inland water and estuary craft normally consists of increasing the stern draft to get the rudder and propeller under water. In my (somewhat limited I must admit) experience the ballast tank is filled. The requirement of maneuverability taking precedence over any reduction in fwd visibility. (especially when transiting numerous bridges in strong stream conditions) further to my post.......a view from standing by the wheelbox of a light barge note lookout on bow SAM_2480 by mudlarker2, on Flickr
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Post by Deleted on Apr 9, 2020 8:57:37 GMT
Do they use cameras as well?
ETA I think @nemesis was under the impression the Bowbelle was carrying cargo which was not the case. Being a dredger it had delivered it's cargo and was returning to the dredging grounds in ballast.
lade1 /leɪd/ Learn to pronounce verbARCHAIC past tense: laded put cargo on board (a ship). ship (goods) as cargo. "the surplus products must be laden on board the vessels" (of a ship) take on cargo. "vessels lade there"
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Post by Deleted on Apr 9, 2020 9:03:28 GMT
Great photo JohnV ... makes sense of some of the stuff I'm reading here, thanks. Rog
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Post by TonyDunkley on Apr 9, 2020 16:36:25 GMT
From MIAB report part 1: 3.4 BOWBELLE reported to Thames Navigation Service (TNS) (Woolwich Radio) at 0103 Hrs that she was singling up ready to depart. She reported again at Vauxhall Bridge (0 I20 Hrs) and Waterloo Bridge (0135 hrs). For the benefit of other river users Woolwich included her as being outward bound ‘through bridges’ in the routine half-hourly Information broadcasts at 01 15 hrs and 0145 hrs; this was normal practice. No broadcasts were made by or concerning MARCHIONESS, which was also normal. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ So we have a large (80 metre) vessel with limited forward visibility indicating intention and then confirmed as travelling outward bound through bridges via VHF. And nobody on the smaller vessel heard any of the announcements. Problem here. There certainly is, . . but there was also another 'problem' which, as far as I'm aware, has never been mentioned or considered as a major contributory factor at any time since the night of what was in truth a very preventable tragedy. It concerns the unfailing predictability of the times of departures and movements of ships proceeding to sea from berths on the upper tidal reaches of commercially used rivers. The departure time of any large vessel sailing from any upriver berth on such a river will ALWAYS be closely governed by the time and state of the incoming (Flood) tide, and I'm fairly certain that this important fact has never warranted even a passing mention in any of the reports produced on this accident. The departure time of BOWBELLE from it's upriver discharging berth, and indeed the departure times of every other similar vessel from a similarly located berth prior to and since the night of this tragedy, would have been subject to two vital considerations ; firstly, that the tide had made enough for the ship to have sufficient clearance under it's keel so as not to adversely affect steering, and secondly, that there was enough of the Flood still to run up so as to ensure that the vessel would clear (ie. get through) all of the closely spaced bridges upriver of Tower Bridge under maximum control whilst still stemming the Flood. It follows, therefore, that the times of any such probable vessel movements are readily obtainable from the tidal predictions for any given day, and will fall within a relatively short time frame. It further follows that at the time of the collision between MARCHIONESS and BOWBELLE, the MARCHIONESS had no business to be dawdling along, in the dark, at barely 3 knots anywhere in the deepwater channel, . . and especially in a part of the river where the frequency and spacing of the numerous bridges added to the vessel's already poor astern visibilty.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 9, 2020 17:34:30 GMT
That's a very well thought out argument and I can't help agreeing with it.
Maybe knowledge of commercial shipping patterns should be a requirement to obtain a boatmasters certificate.
Unfortunately I don't think anything that rigorous is, or was, required.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 9, 2020 18:31:13 GMT
Your comment about "laded" does not make a great deal of sense. Ballasting on inland water and estuary craft normally consists of increasing the stern draft to get the rudder and propeller under water. In my (somewhat limited I must admit) experience the ballast tank is filled. The requirement of maneuverability taking precedence over any reduction in fwd visibility. (especially when transiting numerous bridges in strong stream conditions) further to my post.......a view from standing by the wheelbox of a light barge note lookout on bow SAM_2480 by mudlarker2, on Flickr Ok, my use of the term 'laden' is entirely inappropriate and indeed makes a huge difference to the discussion. Sorry about that. Was the need for ballast achieved (on Bowbelle at any rate) through the use of a ballast tank?
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Post by Deleted on Apr 9, 2020 18:43:59 GMT
7.10 On the specific problem of visibility astern from the wheelhouses of Thames passenger launches, investigations by the inspectors lead to the belief that, in spite of the considerable improvements carried out in I983/84 following the series of minor collisions noted in Annex 1 1, the situation on many boats is still unsatisfactory and should be looked at again. The type of wheelhouse where the skipper has to leave the wheel and either go out to the ship’s side, or climb a ladder and/or raise a hatch in order to see astern positively inhibits the keeping of a proper look-out, and is unacceptable. It is strongly recommended that regulations be introduced governing this aspect of passenger launch construction for new vessels, and that the regulations should also be applicable to existing vessels where the visibility astern does not reach a minimum safe standard. The requirement that a vessel has a low air draught in order to navigate under bridges, thus restricting the height of the steering position, should not take precedence over the fundamental requirement to keep a proper look-out. A satisfactory standard would be achieved if the skipper could see comfortably round a 360 degree arc by moving from say 1 metre to port of the steering position to 1 metre to starboard. If, after exploring all possibilities (including optical devices, on which there have been significant developments in the last few years), it is found impossible to achieve this, then the vessel should carry an additional crew member with the sole duty of look-out.
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Odd formatting a result of copy and paste from a pdf document.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 9, 2020 18:45:49 GMT
From MIAB report part 1: 3.1 BOWBELLE left the Metro Greenham Aggregates berth at Nine Elms Reach at 01 I2 hrs on 20 August, bound for the Shipwash dredging grounds. She was in ballast, drawing approximately 2.0 metres forward and 3.2 metres aft and. therefore, trimmed some 1.2 metres by the stern ---- 3.4 BOWBELLE reported to Thames Navigation Service (TNS) (Woolwich Radio) at 0103 Hrs that she was singling up ready to depart. She reported again at Vauxhall Bridge (0 I20 Hrs) and Waterloo Bridge (0135 hrs). For the benefit of other river users Woolwich included her as being outward bound ‘through bridges’ in the routine half-hourly Information broadcasts at 01 15 hrs and 0145 hrs; this was normal practice. No broadcasts were made by or concerning MARCHIONESS, which was also normal. ---- So we have a large (80 metre) vessel with limited forward visibility indicating intention and then confirmed as travelling outward bound through bridges via VHF. And nobody on the smaller vessel heard any of the announcements. Problem here. All official conclusions are that both vessels failed to maintain an adequate lookout, and it would seem at least possible that VHF announcements (probably routine) were ignored. This entirely excuses the Bowbelle from ramming and sinking the Marchioness. "It took 11 years and several costly independent reports...for it to be acknowledged [the Marchioness] had first been rammed from the back and only then shunted across the dredger’s prow, causing the gash."
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Post by Deleted on Apr 9, 2020 18:50:00 GMT
The Bowbelle at level trim. Note the excellent visibility forward (sorry for'ard).
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