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Post by TonyDunkley on Apr 13, 2020 15:46:01 GMT
I did read the report very thoroughly when it was first published, but I can't remember anything in it about the operators of any sort or size of vessels wrongly assuming 'right of way' over others. It was a long time ago, of course, but I don't actually recall the expression 'right of way' being used at all. What I do recall was being more than a little disappointed in the fudged conclusions with which the report ended, . . and the way the authors skated round the subject of the numerous earlier near misses and the almost casual dismissal of requests from the operators of BOWBELLE, and similar vessels, for action on the part of the authorities to bring about better observance of the rules intended to keep smaller vessels, such as MARCHIONESS, out of the centreline track through the deepwater channel from which larger, deeper draughted vessels are unable to deviate, . . particularly on the 'through bridges' stretch above Tower Bridge. Your background in commercial non passenger inland shipping means you are liable to believe that the passenger launch was at fault. If you had a background in passenger launches you may well feel the opposite. And I agree with you about the "traffic separation scheme" type system, it would make sense. On the face of it, what you say about my background would appear to make perfect sense, . . but in fact, it doesn't ! The years I spent working commercial cargo barges of various types and sizes began on relatively small vessels operating on the Manchester Ship Canal, the Weaver, and occasionally the Mersey, and ended on 500 tonners operating on the Humber, Ouse and Trent, . . but they all had one thing in common, . . they were based in, or worked out of, to or past, ports situated inland which handled coastal and ocean-going shipping - ie. Salford (Manchester Docks), Ellesmere Port (Manchester Ship Canal) Anderton (River Weaver), Goole and Selby (River Ouse), Gainsborough and the wharves below Gunness (River Trent), and closest of all the Humber ports to the sea, Hull itself. If, as was frequently and routinely the case, the barges were underway at 'tide time' and found themselves sharing the, in places, very narrow and restricted deepwater channels with the inbound or outbound and much faster moving shipping, the responsibility for keeping out of the way and avoiding collisions fell entirely to the barge traffic, both from the practical considerations of self-preservation, and under the various navigation and harbour authority's byelaws and navigation rules. In my view there is absolutely no question that if the PLA had been enforcing their own 'no impeding' rule, along with the relevant parts of the Colregs, . . and if MARCHIONESS had kept to the same prudent track through arches No. 4 of Southwark and Cannon Street Bridges that HURLINGHAM took on that fateful night back in 1989, there would have been no collision with BOWBELLE, and no-one would have died. I don't believe that a full blown Traffic Separation Scheme, as such, is or was ever necessary anywhere on the Thames tideway. What is, and was, needed is simply a far more rigorous application of the existing rules, and above all, a general resumption on the part of the skippers of the smaller vessels using the river of the observance of the proven time-honoured practices that had to be relied on in the days before the likes of VHF radio and AIS came along and contributed to a somewhat false sense of invulnerability amongst those in charge of smaller vessels sharing a relatively confined space with sea-going shipping.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 13, 2020 15:53:23 GMT
Yes good comments specially about the false sense of security provided by VHF. This incident proves it because the Bowbelle was indicated as moving outward bound several times yet not heard by the Marchioness.
I do think you are fundamentally correct on this but I also think boats should be made where the person in charge can see what is happening around them.
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Post by JohnV on Apr 13, 2020 17:12:16 GMT
Yes good comments specially about the false sense of security provided by VHF. This incident proves it because the Bowbelle was indicated as moving outward bound several times yet not heard by the Marchioness. I do think you are fundamentally correct on this but I also think boats should be made where the person in charge can see what is happening around them. don't try a crane barge then wheelbox on left SAM_2385 by mudlarker, on Flickr view from the wheel SAM_2147 by mudlarker, on Flickr should explain that the area to the right where the bundles of rope and the generator are stood is the pontoon bolted on the side for extra stability, the tall pole in front of the yellow generator is a spud leg that is dropped into the mud to hold position and the 42 foot nelson by the rope is being towed alongside and is going to be a safety boat on the job ........made looking for the buoys ........ interesting
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Post by Deleted on Apr 14, 2020 7:30:30 GMT
Your background in commercial non passenger inland shipping means you are liable to believe that the passenger launch was at fault. If you had a background in passenger launches you may well feel the opposite. And I agree with you about the "traffic separation scheme" type system, it would make sense. On the face of it, what you say about my background would appear to make perfect sense, . . but in fact, it doesn't ! The years I spent working commercial cargo barges of various types and sizes began on relatively small vessels operating on the Manchester Ship Canal, the Weaver, and occasionally the Mersey, and ended on 500 tonners operating on the Humber, Ouse and Trent, . . but they all had one thing in common, . . they were based in, or worked out of, to or past, ports situated inland which handled coastal and ocean-going shipping - ie. Salford (Manchester Docks), Ellesmere Port (Manchester Ship Canal) Anderton (River Weaver), Goole and Selby (River Ouse), Gainsborough and the wharves below Gunness (River Trent), and closest of all the Humber ports to the sea, Hull itself. If, as was frequently and routinely the case, the barges were underway at 'tide time' and found themselves sharing the, in places, very narrow and restricted deepwater channels with the inbound or outbound and much faster moving shipping, the responsibility for keeping out of the way and avoiding collisions fell entirely to the barge traffic, both from the practical considerations of self-preservation, and under the various navigation and harbour authority's byelaws and navigation rules. In my view there is absolutely no question that if the PLA had been enforcing their own 'no impeding' rule, along with the relevant parts of the Colregs, . . and if MARCHIONESS had kept to the same prudent track through arches No. 4 of Southwark and Cannon Street Bridges that HURLINGHAM took on that fateful night back in 1989, there would have been no collision with BOWBELLE, and no-one would have died. I don't believe that a full blown Traffic Separation Scheme, as such, is or was ever necessary anywhere on the Thames tideway. What is, and was, needed is simply a far more rigorous application of the existing rules, and above all, a general resumption on the part of the skippers of the smaller vessels using the river of the observance of the proven time-honoured practices that had to be relied on in the days before the likes of VHF radio and AIS came along and contributed to a somewhat false sense of invulnerability amongst those in charge of smaller vessels sharing a relatively confined space with sea-going shipping. Once more, the matter of the course of the Marchioness at the point of collision is, at the least, conjecture. What is undisputed is that if the Bowbelle had kept an adequate lookout then the collision would not have occurred. It is a matter of record that the Bowbelle was previously involved in a collision with a passenger vessel (which was non-fatal) under the same skipper, and that the verdict of the root cause was that an adequate lookout was not kept. So your conclusion that greater emphasis on safety be enforced is a good one, although I have difficulty imagining how that might be enforced on a daily basis, or to what extent you might flout the law before being prosecuted for doing so. Perhaps the compulsory use of AIS and VHF on tidal waters along with mandatory training in their use is in fact the answer and not the problem. Yes, I know that it is already mandatory to possess a marine VHF licence (I have one), but despite all the dire warnings about mandatory fines for using such a device 'other than in accordance' (as I imagine it would be termed) I have never heard of anyone actually being charged, and yet I know of many instances where un-licensed misuse occurs (every Sunday race meeting actually). So much for enforcement of the rules. Still, things could be worse. It could be France, for example. Diverging slightly from the main subject, it is my experience that the 'rag and stick brigade' are the bunch which enthusiastically familiarise themselves with the rules, whereas the RYA 'Coastal Skipper' qualification (or equivalent) is something that owners of motor-boats often seem to regard as an annoying formality.
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Post by TonyDunkley on Apr 15, 2020 3:35:50 GMT
On the night of the sinking, a sister ship to 'Marchioness', and another ex-Salter's steamer, the 'Hurlingham', with equally bad rearward visibility, was also out on a virtually identical schedule and was overtaken, safely and without incident, by the 'Bowbelle' just moments before hitting the 'Marchioness'. Except that Hurlingham did not have restricted visibility astern. Totally different helm layout as you can see in these pictures I stole off the internet. Hurlingham has a higher wheelhouse with much more glass than Marchioness. It was established that the skipper of the Marchioness could not see directly behind from helm position. I think the Hurlingham skipper can. This does make a material difference to outcomes. Again, what you say does appear on the face of it to make perfectly good sense, . . it is, however, the wheelhouse glass itself that can create severe visibility problems, at night, when the navigation lamps of other vessels are surrounded by a multitude of shore lights on wharves, jetties, and buildings, . . and street lamps ! Astern visibility from HURLINGHAM's wheel during daylight hours would obviously be fine, . . but in the dark it would be a very different matter. The problem in keeping a lookout from small wheelhouses at night - the one on HURLINGHAM is roughly the same dimensions as the average barge wheelhouse - with glass fore and aft, and in both sides, is that what looks like lights seen through the window you're looking through can sometimes be reflections from one of the other windows behind you or to the sides. This is a serious enough matter on relatively wide open and sparsely lit rivers carrying shipping, . . but at night on the Thames tideway in central London trying to pick out and identify the navigation lamps of an approaching ship from amongst all the other lights seen either directly through any of the wheelhouse windows or indirectly as a reflection from another wheelhouse window would be an unacceptably slow and unreliable process. The only way to be absolutely sure that none of the lights visible through, or in, the wheelhouse windows belonged to an approaching ship, otherwise hidden partly by the darkness and partly by being lost amongst hundreds of other extraneous lights, would be to leave the wheelhouse and have a good, long and careful look around from the deck, or to delegate the task to another of the crew, . . which is, of course, precisely what the skipper of the MARCHIONESS should have done before moving into the deepwater channel under arch No.3 of Southwark Bridge to overtake HURLINGHAM.
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Post by JohnV on Apr 15, 2020 5:35:39 GMT
Navigating at night anywhere where there is a plethora of lights can be a total nightmare.
Parts of the Thames tideway are one, it is extremely easy to be confused about the identity of lights or to be unable to pick out ones that might be critical like other vessels navigation lights.
Familiarity with an area helps but even then, shore lights coloured or otherwise are often frequently moved and changed and glare from poweful floodlights can be a real problem
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Post by TonyDunkley on Apr 15, 2020 5:52:31 GMT
On the face of it, what you say about my background would appear to make perfect sense, . . but in fact, it doesn't ! The years I spent working commercial cargo barges of various types and sizes began on relatively small vessels operating on the Manchester Ship Canal, the Weaver, and occasionally the Mersey, and ended on 500 tonners operating on the Humber, Ouse and Trent, . . but they all had one thing in common, . . they were based in, or worked out of, to or past, ports situated inland which handled coastal and ocean-going shipping - ie. Salford (Manchester Docks), Ellesmere Port (Manchester Ship Canal) Anderton (River Weaver), Goole and Selby (River Ouse), Gainsborough and the wharves below Gunness (River Trent), and closest of all the Humber ports to the sea, Hull itself. If, as was frequently and routinely the case, the barges were underway at 'tide time' and found themselves sharing the, in places, very narrow and restricted deepwater channels with the inbound or outbound and much faster moving shipping, the responsibility for keeping out of the way and avoiding collisions fell entirely to the barge traffic, both from the practical considerations of self-preservation, and under the various navigation and harbour authority's byelaws and navigation rules. In my view there is absolutely no question that if the PLA had been enforcing their own 'no impeding' rule, along with the relevant parts of the Colregs, . . and if MARCHIONESS had kept to the same prudent track through arches No. 4 of Southwark and Cannon Street Bridges that HURLINGHAM took on that fateful night back in 1989, there would have been no collision with BOWBELLE, and no-one would have died. I don't believe that a full blown Traffic Separation Scheme, as such, is or was ever necessary anywhere on the Thames tideway. What is, and was, needed is simply a far more rigorous application of the existing rules, and above all, a general resumption on the part of the skippers of the smaller vessels using the river of the observance of the proven time-honoured practices that had to be relied on in the days before the likes of VHF radio and AIS came along and contributed to a somewhat false sense of invulnerability amongst those in charge of smaller vessels sharing a relatively confined space with sea-going shipping. Once more, the matter of the course of the Marchioness at the point of collision is, at the least, conjecture. What is undisputed is that if the Bowbelle had kept an adequate lookout then the collision would not have occurred. It is a matter of record that the Bowbelle was previously involved in a collision with a passenger vessel (which was non-fatal) under the same skipper, and that the verdict of the root cause was that an adequate lookout was not kept. So your conclusion that greater emphasis on safety be enforced is a good one, although I have difficulty imagining how that might be enforced on a daily basis, or to what extent you might flout the law before being prosecuted for doing so. Rubbish, . . MARCHIONESS took the centre arch - No.3 - of Southwark Bridge and cleared it a matter of only yards ahead of BOWBELLE. The collision then occurred well within the (approx) 150 yards distance to Cannon Street Railway Bridge, and on the line/track that BOWBELLE would have to follow to take the centre arch - again, No.3 - of Cannon Street Bridge, . . the only arch BOWBELLE could use at that state of the tide. At the state of the tide at the time of the collision - a bit before half Flood - arch No.3 of Cannon Street Bridge was the only arch with sufficient depth of water immediately upriver and downriver of it for a vessel drawing the best part of 11 feet to use and expect to retain full steering control whilst so doing, as opposed to the near certainty of taking a violent sheer to port due to 'sniffing the ground' in the shallows immediately downriver of arch No.4 if that one had been used instead. Before you dismiss any of the above as 'conjecture', take a look at the soundings along the South side of the river, either side of Cannon Street Bridge, on the chartlets published with the MAIB report on the collision.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 15, 2020 8:48:09 GMT
From MAIB report And the Navionics chart currently on myshiptracking AIS website "nautical" layout.
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Post by TonyDunkley on Apr 15, 2020 18:31:45 GMT
From MAIB report And the Navionics chart currently on myshiptracking AIS website "nautical" layout. The depths in and around arches No.3 and 4 of both bridges don't look to have changed much over the years since the collision. Do you have any published figures for the typical mean Spring range at London Bridge and LW Springs heights, . . I've based my conclusions (above) on the range being around 22' - 24', and LW Springs being somewhere around (local) Chart Datum.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 15, 2020 19:52:47 GMT
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Post by TonyDunkley on Apr 16, 2020 6:22:52 GMT
Thanks for that, . . nice to see proper units of measurement still being used ! < www.pla.co.uk/assets/PLA_TIDEBOOK__2009_30.pdf > I had a butchers on the PLA website as well and found the above link to some 2009 tidal info which shows the Mean Spring Range averaging out at 6.6m between Tower Bridge and Blackfriars Bridge, . . so that estimate of mine really needs to come down to around 22' at the scene of the collision. Looking at the MAIB report chartlets again in conjunction with that Mean Spring Range figure of 22' it's very apparent that any vessel drawing around 11' and outbound through bridges at or before half Flood would always take the central arch No.3 at both Southwark and Cannon Street Bridges, and it's equally evident that at that state of the tide, when vessels such as BOWBELLE can be expected to be underway outbound, there is more than ample depth for vessels such as MARCHIONESS under arches No.4 of Southwark and Cannon Street Bridges as well as on a line immediately upriver, between and downriver of arch No.4 of the two bridges. In other words, there was no reason, or need, for MARCHIONESS to have been in the deepwater channel and sharing arch No.3 of Southwark Bridge with BOWBELLE, . . . and given that the astern visibility from MARCHIONESS's wheelhouse was so seriously restricted, there is absolutely no way that MARCHIONESS should have been anywhere near to the track it was following at that time and at that state of the tide.
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Post by JohnV on Apr 16, 2020 6:31:43 GMT
reason ...... need ...... courtesy ...... City Cruisers ........ Hmmmmph !!!
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Post by JohnV on Apr 16, 2020 6:42:52 GMT
please leave space for a 105 foot barge that has to load on the pontoon. Single screw, no girly button. SAM_2826 by mudlarker, on Flickr clearance at bow SAM_2827 by mudlarker, on Flickr clearance at stern (sorry about the quality I was being rushed) SAM_2829 by mudlarker, on Flickr room they had behind them on the pontoon
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Post by Deleted on Apr 16, 2020 8:36:24 GMT
Thanks for that, . . nice to see proper units of measurement still being used ! < www.pla.co.uk/assets/PLA_TIDEBOOK__2009_30.pdf > I had a butchers on the PLA website as well and found the above link to some 2009 tidal info which shows the Mean Spring Range averaging out at 6.6m between Tower Bridge and Blackfriars Bridge, . . so that estimate of mine really needs to come down to around 22' at the scene of the collision. Looking at the MAIB report chartlets again in conjunction with that Mean Spring Range figure of 22' it's very apparent that any vessel drawing around 11' and outbound through bridges at or before half Flood would always take the central arch No.3 at both Southwark and Cannon Street Bridges, and it's equally evident that at that state of the tide, when vessels such as BOWBELLE can be expected to be underway outbound, there is more than ample depth for vessels such as MARCHIONESS under arches No.4 of Southwark and Cannon Street Bridges as well as on a line immediately upriver, between and downriver of arch No.4 of the two bridges. In other words, there was no reason, or need, for MARCHIONESS to have been in the deepwater channel and sharing arch No.3 of Southwark Bridge with BOWBELLE, . . . and given that the astern visibility from MARCHIONESS's wheelhouse was so seriously restricted, there is absolutely no way that MARCHIONESS should have been anywhere near to the track it was following at that time and at that state of the tide. Charles Heddon Cave, QC...and Michael Mansfield, QC...said: "There was overwhelming opportunities for the Bowbelle crew to have spotted the Marchioness and taken action to avoid this collision."
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Post by Deleted on Apr 16, 2020 8:57:21 GMT
But how much practical knowledge did they have?
I have consistently argued that the lack of visibility is what caused this but you have to admit that Tony has got a fair point that if the passenger launch had been separated from the path of the dredger then it would have been physically impossible for the incident to have occurred.
It does seem interesting that the Marchioness overtook the Hurlingham. I wonder if there was a particular reason for that for example a higher average speed required for its particular cruise. It would seem more sensible overall to have overtaken once clear of bridges.
A quick plot of the course from between Southwark and Cannon Street rail bridges to tower bridge is about ten minutes at 8km/h so not a lot of time lost there.
There must have been a particular reason for overtaking the Hurlingham in that location.
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